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[ subject:"Banking." ]
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Essays in Banking.
~
Jun, Alice.
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Essays in Banking.
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Essays in Banking./
作者:
Jun, Alice.
出版者:
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:
146 p.
附註:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: A.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International80-03A(E).
標題:
Finance. -
電子資源:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10809397
ISBN:
9780438550612
Essays in Banking.
Jun, Alice.
Essays in Banking.
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 146 p.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: A.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2018.
This dissertation seeks to contribute to our knowledge of banks and how they operate. I explore three broad questions: 1) why certain types of banks are important, 2) how banks use internal capital markets, and 3) what affects banks' decisions to pursue external financing.
ISBN: 9780438550612Subjects--Topical Terms:
542899
Finance.
Essays in Banking.
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This dissertation seeks to contribute to our knowledge of banks and how they operate. I explore three broad questions: 1) why certain types of banks are important, 2) how banks use internal capital markets, and 3) what affects banks' decisions to pursue external financing.
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In Chapter 1, I address the larger question of why small banks are important by exploring if loans from small banks are easily substitutable. I focus on the small business loan market, and I use a bank's exposure to a natural disaster in one county as an instrument for its credit supply to other counties that are unaffected by natural disasters. Through internal capital markets, and due to external financing frictions, a positive credit demand shock in the disaster county becomes a negative credit supply shock to non-disaster counties. Importantly, only small banks shift lending in this manner, allowing me to isolate the effect of a shock from small, and not large, banks. In the non-disaster counties, I find that, first, small banks step in for other small banks, while large banks step in only under conditions that suggest there is less adverse selection in the market. This is consistent with a story in which small banks are important because of their ability to collect soft information (information that is not easily quantifiable) about borrowers. This allows them to serve a segment of the market that large banks are less well-suited to serve, because large banks focus on collecting hard information (information that is easily quantifiable). Second, I find that the credit supply shock has real effects on the number of small businesses; moreover, firms that depend on a local customer base are more adversely affected. This is consistent with a story in which small banks collect soft information about local markets, which allows them to better serve these firms. Overall, the results suggest that small banks play a unique role in a segmented borrower market.
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In Chapter 2, I look at how banks use internal capital markets by focusing on how they shift different types of mortgages across their lending network in response to a disaster. Applying the same identification strategy in Chapter 1 to mortgage markets, I find that most movements of capital are consistent with a story in which banks use internal capital markets to manage liquidity; for example, banks increase total lending to disaster counties while reducing total lending to non-disaster counties, and in particular, banks reduce supply of loans that they keep, but not loans that they sell. However, the most interesting result is that banks increase supply of loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to non-disaster counties, while increasing supply of conventional loans to disaster counties. Because borrowers who obtain FHA loans usually have higher credit risk, this could imply a risk management story: given an influx of safer conventional loans in the non-disaster counties, perhaps banks' appetite for riskier FHA loans in non-disaster counties increases. However, anecdotal evidence suggests some banks believe they are overly compensated for originating FHA loans, relative to the risk they take on by doing so. Thus, these results could also be consistent with a story in which bank (possibly overly) originate FHA loans, because they view these loans are a source of low-risk liquidity.
520
$a
In Chapter 3, I address why banks might have been reluctant to raise external financing during the crisis by exploring the role of strategic complementarities between existing stakeholders and potential investors. I model existing short-term debtholders and a pool of potential equityholders, and I start the game after the bank is already known to be insolvent to strip out the well-documented information channel, through which a bank might be reluctant to issue equity because doing so could signal that the bank is distressed. I find that there is a subset of banks that fail, even though they would have survived if they received full financing. For these banks, debtholders refuse to rollover because they (correctly) anticipate that the equity issuance will fail, and equityholders refuse to invest because they anticipate that the bank will suffer a rollover freeze. These strategic complementarities clearly lead to an efficiency loss, but can also be part of the solution: a central bank need only invest enough bailout funds to allay current and potential stakeholders.
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