語系:
繁體中文
English
說明(常見問題)
回圖書館首頁
手機版館藏查詢
登入
回首頁
到查詢結果
[ subject:"Health care management." ]
切換:
標籤
|
MARC模式
|
ISBD
The effect of generalist-specialist ...
~
Punzalan, Michael.
FindBook
Google Book
Amazon
博客來
The effect of generalist-specialist integration on physician behavior, medical outcomes, and medical care spending.
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
The effect of generalist-specialist integration on physician behavior, medical outcomes, and medical care spending./
作者:
Punzalan, Michael.
出版者:
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
面頁冊數:
197 p.
附註:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International78-04A(E).
標題:
Economics. -
電子資源:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10192070
ISBN:
9781369340372
The effect of generalist-specialist integration on physician behavior, medical outcomes, and medical care spending.
Punzalan, Michael.
The effect of generalist-specialist integration on physician behavior, medical outcomes, and medical care spending.
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 197 p.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-04(E), Section: A.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2016.
I study the effects of integration among generalist and specialist physicians on referral and treatment choices, inpatient admissions, and the cost of medical care. I first construct a novel data set that links the structure of physician organizations to physician behavior for two groups of individuals deemed most likely to benefit from generalist-specialist integra- tion: individuals diagnosed with hypertension and diabetes mellitus. Due to differential selection across integrated and non-integrated practices, ordinary least squares regression is unlikely to identify the effects of interest. To surmount the identification problem, I simulate random assignment of beneficiaries to physician organizations in an instrumental variables framework. My estimates confirm that integration among generalist and special- ists significantly affects referral decisions and treatment patterns. I fail to detect evidence that this kind of integration improves medical outcomes or reduces medical care spend- ing. These findings strongly suggest that policies increasing generalist-specialist integration in piece-rate or fee-for-service environments are unlikely to achieve their goals. Finally, I consider the theoretical literature that might rationalize generalist-specialist integration patterns. I show that most potential explanations are inconsistent with my evidence, save for David and Neuman (2011), suggesting that task adhesion should be a focal point for future research.
ISBN: 9781369340372Subjects--Topical Terms:
517137
Economics.
The effect of generalist-specialist integration on physician behavior, medical outcomes, and medical care spending.
LDR
:02444nmm a2200289 4500
001
2122117
005
20170912094006.5
008
180830s2016 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020
$a
9781369340372
035
$a
(MiAaPQ)AAI10192070
035
$a
AAI10192070
040
$a
MiAaPQ
$c
MiAaPQ
100
1
$a
Punzalan, Michael.
$3
3284070
245
1 4
$a
The effect of generalist-specialist integration on physician behavior, medical outcomes, and medical care spending.
260
1
$a
Ann Arbor :
$b
ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
$c
2016
300
$a
197 p.
500
$a
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-04(E), Section: A.
500
$a
Advisers: Guy David; Robert J. Town.
502
$a
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2016.
520
$a
I study the effects of integration among generalist and specialist physicians on referral and treatment choices, inpatient admissions, and the cost of medical care. I first construct a novel data set that links the structure of physician organizations to physician behavior for two groups of individuals deemed most likely to benefit from generalist-specialist integra- tion: individuals diagnosed with hypertension and diabetes mellitus. Due to differential selection across integrated and non-integrated practices, ordinary least squares regression is unlikely to identify the effects of interest. To surmount the identification problem, I simulate random assignment of beneficiaries to physician organizations in an instrumental variables framework. My estimates confirm that integration among generalist and special- ists significantly affects referral decisions and treatment patterns. I fail to detect evidence that this kind of integration improves medical outcomes or reduces medical care spend- ing. These findings strongly suggest that policies increasing generalist-specialist integration in piece-rate or fee-for-service environments are unlikely to achieve their goals. Finally, I consider the theoretical literature that might rationalize generalist-specialist integration patterns. I show that most potential explanations are inconsistent with my evidence, save for David and Neuman (2011), suggesting that task adhesion should be a focal point for future research.
590
$a
School code: 0175.
650
4
$a
Economics.
$3
517137
650
4
$a
Health care management.
$3
2122906
690
$a
0501
690
$a
0769
710
2
$a
University of Pennsylvania.
$b
Health Care Management & Economics.
$3
3284071
773
0
$t
Dissertation Abstracts International
$g
78-04A(E).
790
$a
0175
791
$a
Ph.D.
792
$a
2016
793
$a
English
856
4 0
$u
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10192070
筆 0 讀者評論
館藏地:
全部
電子資源
出版年:
卷號:
館藏
1 筆 • 頁數 1 •
1
條碼號
典藏地名稱
館藏流通類別
資料類型
索書號
使用類型
借閱狀態
預約狀態
備註欄
附件
W9332733
電子資源
01.外借(書)_YB
電子書
EB
一般使用(Normal)
在架
0
1 筆 • 頁數 1 •
1
多媒體
評論
新增評論
分享你的心得
Export
取書館
處理中
...
變更密碼
登入