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Commonsense pluralism about truth = ...

Ulatowski, Joseph.

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Commonsense pluralism about truth = an empirical defence /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Commonsense pluralism about truth/ by Joseph Ulatowski.
其他題名:	an empirical defence /
作者:	Ulatowski, Joseph.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2017.,
面頁冊數:	xxv, 140 p. :ill., digital ;22 cm.
內容註:	Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: On the "Common Conception" of Truth -- Chapter 3: A Defence of Descriptive Metaphysics -- Chapter 4: An Ecological Approach in Experimental Philosophy -- Chapter 5: Commonsense Pluralism about Truth (Endoxic Alethic Pluralism) Chapter 6: Challenging Endoxic Alethic Pluralism.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Truth. -
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69465-8
ISBN:	9783319694658

Commonsense pluralism about truth = an empirical defence /
Ulatowski, Joseph.

Commonsense pluralism about truthan empirical defence /[electronic resource] :by Joseph Ulatowski. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2017. - xxv, 140 p. :ill., digital ;22 cm.

Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: On the "Common Conception" of Truth -- Chapter 3: A Defence of Descriptive Metaphysics -- Chapter 4: An Ecological Approach in Experimental Philosophy -- Chapter 5: Commonsense Pluralism about Truth (Endoxic Alethic Pluralism) Chapter 6: Challenging Endoxic Alethic Pluralism.

Truth is a pervasive feature of ordinary language, deserving of systematic study, and few theorists of truth have endeavoured to chronicle the tousled conceptual terrain forming the non-philosopher's ordinary view. In this book, the author recasts the philosophical treatment of truth in light of historical and recent work in experimental philosophy. He argues that the commonsense view of truth is deeply fragmented along two axes, across different linguistic discourses and among different demographics, termed in the book as endoxic alethic pluralism. To defend this view, four conclusions must be reached: (1) endoxic alethic pluralism should be compatible with how the everyday person uses truth, (2) the common conception of truth should be derivable from empirical data, (3) this descriptive metaphysical project is one aspect of a normative theory of truth, and (4) endoxic alethic pluralism is at least partially immune to challenges facing the ecological method in experimental philosophy and alethic pluralism.

ISBN: 9783319694658

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-69465-8doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

526877
Truth.

LC Class. No.: BD171 / .U38 2017

Dewey Class. No.: 121

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