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Freedom, self-knowledge, and self-de...

Jones-Cathcart, Andrew John.

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Freedom, self-knowledge, and self-deception: A problematic in the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard (Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Soren Kierkegaard).

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Freedom, self-knowledge, and self-deception: A problematic in the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard (Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Soren Kierkegaard)./
作者:	Jones-Cathcart, Andrew John.
面頁冊數:	579 p.
附註:	Director: George Khushf.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-05A
標題:	Philosophy -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3052047
ISBN:	0493663924

Freedom, self-knowledge, and self-deception: A problematic in the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard (Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Soren Kierkegaard).
Jones-Cathcart, Andrew John.

Freedom, self-knowledge, and self-deception: A problematic in the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard (Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Soren Kierkegaard). - 579 p.

Director: George Khushf.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of South Carolina, 2002.

The dissertation argues that transparent self-knowledge is a necessary condition of free will and investigates the epistemic limitations on such knowledge created by self-deception. It frames this problematic relationship between freedom, self-knowledge, and self-deception as a perennial but latent problematic in the history of philosophy which found explicit articulation in the Enlightenment rationality of Kant and Hegel and one of their critics, Kierkegaard. For this reason, the project intensively and comprehensively examines the problematic relationship between these concepts in each thinker, as well as in the history of the philosophical project as a whole. The overall argument of the dissertation seeks to show that the various attempts by these thinkers to comprehend freedom philosophically ultimately fail, and that this failure is suggestive of a Kierkegaardian deconstruction of the very possibility of a philosophically cogent theory of freedom. For this reason, it is further suggested that in place of philosophical theories of the self <italic>qua </italic> free agent, a conception of religious transcendence is required if the self-deceptive tendencies of the philosophical project as a whole are to be kept in check

ISBN: 0493663924Subjects--Topical Terms:

550317
Philosophy

Freedom, self-knowledge, and self-deception: A problematic in the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard (Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Soren Kierkegaard).
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