東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Repeated games /

Sorin, Sylvain.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Repeated games /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Repeated games // Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, Shmuel Zamir.
作者:	Mertens, Jean-François,
其他作者:	Sorin, Sylvain.
出版者:	New York, NY :Cambridge University Press, : 2015.,
面頁冊數:	xxviii, 567 p. :ill. ;24 cm.
標題:	Game theory. -
ISBN:	9781107662636

Repeated games /
Mertens, Jean-François,1946-

Repeated games /Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, Shmuel Zamir. - New York, NY :Cambridge University Press,2015. - xxviii, 567 p. :ill. ;24 cm. - Econometric society monographs ;49. - Econometric society monographs ;49..

Includes bibliographical references (p. 533-547) and indexes.

Basic results on normal-form games --

"Starting with the basic results of normal form games, the authors move on to review the main properties of repeated games and covering supergames. The author then present the first exhaustive study of repeated games with incomplete information (first on one side then on both sides), including the asymptotic approach and the undiscounted maxmin/minmax. Their analysis then proceeds to stochastic games: Shapley operator, algebraic aspect, asymptotic and uniform approaches. The final section discusses new advances in areas such as incomplete information games with signals; stochastic games with lack of information; and non zero-sum games with incomplete information, including communication devices and equilibria. Game theory is extensively used in economics and other social sciences. This book offers a comprehensive treatment of repeated games. Starting with the basic results of normal form games, the authors move on to review the main properties of repeated games, covering supergames, games with incomplete information, and stochastic games. The final section discusses new advances in areas such as incomplete information games with signals and stochastic games with lack of information, and non zero-sum games with incomplete information including communication devices and equilibria"--

ISBN: 9781107662636US62.00

LCCN: 2014006953Subjects--Topical Terms:

532607
Game theory.

LC Class. No.: HB144 / .M47 2015

Dewey Class. No.: 519.3

Repeated games /
LDR:03340cam a2200253 a 450 001 2047383
005 20150505183847.0
008 170315s2015 nyua b 001 0 eng
010 $a 2014006953
020 $a 9781107662636 $q (pbk.) : $c US62.00
020 $a 110766263X $q (pbk.)
020 $a 9781107030206 $q (hbk.)
020 $a 110703020X $q (hbk.)
040 $a DLC $b eng
050 0 0 $a HB144 $b .M47 2015
082 0 0 $a 519.3 $2 23
084 $a BUS044000 $2 bisacsh
100 1 $a Mertens, Jean-François, $d 1946- $3 3205461
245 1 0 $a Repeated games / $c Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, Shmuel Zamir.
260 # $a New York, NY : $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2015.
300 $a xxviii, 567 p. : $b ill. ; $c 24 cm.
490 1 $a Econometric society monographs ; $v 49
504 $a Includes bibliographical references (p. 533-547) and indexes.
505 0 # $t Basic results on normal-form games -- $t Basic results on extensive-form games -- $t The beliefs space -- $t General model of repeated games -- $t Recursive game -- $t Incomplete information on two sides -- $t Stochastic games -- $t Extensions and further results -- $t Non-zero-sum games with incomplete information.
520 # $a "Starting with the basic results of normal form games, the authors move on to review the main properties of repeated games and covering supergames. The author then present the first exhaustive study of repeated games with incomplete information (first on one side then on both sides), including the asymptotic approach and the undiscounted maxmin/minmax. Their analysis then proceeds to stochastic games: Shapley operator, algebraic aspect, asymptotic and uniform approaches. The final section discusses new advances in areas such as incomplete information games with signals; stochastic games with lack of information; and non zero-sum games with incomplete information, including communication devices and equilibria. Game theory is extensively used in economics and other social sciences. This book offers a comprehensive treatment of repeated games. Starting with the basic results of normal form games, the authors move on to review the main properties of repeated games, covering supergames, games with incomplete information, and stochastic games. The final section discusses new advances in areas such as incomplete information games with signals and stochastic games with lack of information, and non zero-sum games with incomplete information including communication devices and equilibria"-- $c Provided by publisher.
520 # $a "Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at Universite; Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title, "Repeated Games," which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers-many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day"-- $c Provided by publisher.
650 # 0 $a Game theory. $3 532607
650 # 0 $a Stochastic processes. $3 520663
700 1 # $a Sorin, Sylvain. $3 778939
700 1 # $a Zamir, Shmuel. $3 2010691
830 0 $a Econometric society monographs ; $v 49. $3 3205462